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FIDUCIA IN PUBLIC LAW  
Lindsay Breach* 
Breach advances a conceptual basis for understanding fiduciary relationships in a public law setting. 
Fiduciary concepts cut across traditional legal boundaries to encompass a broad array of legal 
relationships. Political theorists and legal commentators have extended these concepts to 
governments, acting as fiduciaries, and their populations. In practice, the courts are reticent to 
impose a fiduciary relationship at public law. However, two lines of authority support the existence 
of fiduciary principles that are unique to public law. The first draws on the Canadian experience with 
a sui generis form of fiduciary relationship between the Crown and indigenous peoples, and later 
commentary on the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. The second is judicial recognition that the 
relationship between local authorities and ratepayers is a fiduciary relationship. Breach argues that 
it is necessary to define fiduciary concepts that are unique to public law. This will avoid the 
uncertainty resulting from a sui generis classification, or worse, the consequences of conflating public 
law with private law fiduciary relationships. In doing so, he reassesses how the duty of loyalty can be 
understood in a public law context. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The notion that fiduciary relationships exist in public law is not particularly novel, but is 
controversial. There is already a large body of literature devoted to the idea that leaders are in a 
fiduciary relationship with the public that gave them a political mandate to act on their behalf.1 The 
judiciary, however, is typically reluctant to recognise new classes of fiduciary relationships in order 
to avoid public perceptions about unnecessary judicial interference. Nevertheless, there is pressure on 
the judiciary to respond to public concerns about weak avenues of political accountability.2 Despite 
the pedigree enjoyed by the concept, the nature and scope of fiduciary relationships in public law 
  
*  LLM (Hons). This work is in memoriam of my grandfather, George Henry Biggs, who passed away after 
attaining his 88th year in 2013. Special thanks to Alice Coppard for her exceptional editing. The article was 
written and accepted before the Supreme Court's decision in Proprietors of Wakatu v Attorney-General [2017] 
NZSC 17, [2017] 1 NZLR 423.  
1  See for example Evan Fox-Decent Sovereignty's Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011) at 173; and D Theodore Rave "Politicians as Fiduciaries" (2013) 126 Harv L Rev 671 at 708. 
2  JS Maloy "Two Concepts of Trust" (2009) 71 The Journal of Politics 492 at 503. 
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sorely needs some guidelines.3 It is important to remember that the ius publicum (public law 
jurisprudence) concerns any principle or rule relating to the operation of the state.4 An approach to 
this subject must be careful not to confound private law and public law principles through artificial 
transposition of the former onto the latter. There are also a number of authorities that recognise public 
law fiduciary relationships. The main category of public law relationships that the judiciary accept as 
fiduciary exist between the Crown and indigenous peoples, and local authorities and ratepayers. The 
infant state of this area of law has already indicated that public law fiduciary relationships will have 
qualities that distinguish them from their private law counterpart. These differences are clearest in the 
softer approach to the duty of loyalty in a public law context. The object of this work is to demonstrate 
that fiduciary relationships are a recognisable feature of the ius publicum and to provide a starting 
point for future extrapolation of principle.  
II BACKGROUND 
The modern term "fiduciary" derives its meaning from a medieval interpretation of Roman law, 
and the translation of the term fiducia to impose legal duties on the stronger party for the protection 
of the weaker.5 The notions attached to this civil law term formed part of English law through equity.6 
The modern concept of fiduciary did not feature in Roman law.7 Nonetheless, one passage in 
Justinian's Institutes resonates with the English development of the trust in equity, and the 
enforcement of fiduciary obligations today.8 Inst 2.23.1 states that fideicommissa were originally 
unenforceable and relied on the conscience of the stronger party.9 Emperor Augustus intervened and 
its principles formed part of the Roman ius honorarium or "honorarian law". George Spence identified 
that the English experience with the recognition of fiduciary duties in equity coincidentally follows 
the Roman pattern of development.10 However, the civil law did not limit this "trust concept", or fides,  
  
3  Gerald Lanning "The Crown-Māori Relationship: The Spectre of a Fiduciary Duty" (1999) 8 AULR 445 at 
458. 
4  Justinian Digest (translated ed: Alan Watson (translator), University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1985) at 
1.1.1.2.  
5  Peter Birks "The Context of Fiduciary Obligation" (2000) 34 Israel Law Review 3 at 8. 
6  Leonard Rotman "Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of Understanding" (1996) 34 Alta L Rev 821 at 
822. 
7  Birks, above n 5, at 8. 
8  David Johnston The Roman Law of Trusts (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) at 285; William Buckland "Praetor 
and Chancellor" (1939) 13 Tul L Rev 163 at 164; and Thomas Ridley A view of the Civile and Ecclesiastical 
Law: and wherein the practise of them is streitned and may be relieved within this Land (Printed for the 
Company of Stationers, London, 1607) at 12. 
9  Justinian's Institutes (translated ed: P Birks and G McLeod (translators), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1987).  
10  George Spence The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (Stevens, London, 1846) vol 1 at 411. 
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to the fideicommissum arrangement. It applied fides to a number of legal relationships arising in both 
the law of persons and the law of things.11 The legal relationship itself would define what duties the 
fiduciary relationship would impose on the stronger party (for example, the medieval concept included 
the guardianship of children – law of persons, and the relationship between heirs and beneficiaries – 
law of things). This brief foray into the civil law origins seeks to demonstrate the flexibility of fiduciae 
concepts to apply to all kinds of legal relationships. 
The prevailing view of fiduciary duties as a concept that cuts across traditional legal boundaries 
does not indicate an experience different from its civil law precursor.12 As a result, the fiduciary 
concept is often criticised as an ill-defined concept marred by controversies despite its lengthy 
pedigree.13 Nevertheless, there are some certain features. The notion of trust underpins all fiduciary 
relationships and will give rise to extraordinary duties.14 In Watson v Dolmark Industries, Gault J 
recognised that to identify a fiduciary relationship a court must:15 
… look for circumstances in which one person has undertaken to act in the interests of another or 
conversely one has communicated an expectation that another will act to protect or promote his or her 
interests. There are elements of reliance, confidence or trust between them often arising out of an 
imbalance in … rights, powers or the use of information affecting their interests. Telling indications may 
be that person having taken, or been entrusted with opportunity to protect or benefit others stand in a 
position also to prefer their own interests. 
The duties are proscriptive in effect and seek to identify what fiduciaries must not do, implying 
how a fiduciary must act, rather than setting clear guidelines.16 They typically arise when one party 
reposed a special trust and power in another, which had the effect of leaving the former vulnerable to 
the actions of the latter.17 This attribute fosters a broad interpretation about when a fiduciary 
obligation may feature as part of a legal relationship.  
  
11  William Buckland A Text-Book of Roman Law: From Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge University Press, 
London, 1921) at 428–429. See also Tamar Frankel Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 
at xiii. 
12  Rotman, above n 6, at 852. 
13  Paul Finn Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney Law Book, Sydney, 1977) at 1; and Leonard Rotman "Fiduciary 
Law's 'Holy Grail': Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence" (2011) 91 BU L Rev 921 at 
923. 
14  Graham Virgo The Principles of Equity and Trusts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 21. 
15  Liggett v Kensington [1993] 1 NZLR 257 (CA) as cited in Watson v Dolmark Industries [1992] 3 NZLR 311 
(CA) at 317–318. 
16  Virgo, above n 14, at 487. 
17  At 479. 
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The kinds of legal relationships that give rise to duties of a fiduciary character are legion.18 
Included amongst their number are the relationship between parents and children, guardian and ward, 
spouses, solicitors and clients, and doctors and patients.19 In Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 
2), Lord Nicholls made the prudent observation that "[t]he types of relationship, such as parent and 
child, in which this principle falls to be applied, cannot be listed exhaustively. Relationships are 
infinitely various."20 This statement highlights the judicial attitude to accept the existence of novel 
circumstances that may give rise to a fiduciary relationship, and a reluctance to confine them to a 
particular set of facts.21 Once the courts accept that a particular legal relationship is fiduciary, the 
difficulty turns to identifying the nature of its obligations.22 Deborah DeMott observes: "Although 
one can identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply with greater 
or lesser force in different contexts involving different types of parties and relationships. Recognition 
that the law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific should be the starting point for any further 
analysis."23 She highlights the futility of an attempt to define them any further than acknowledging 
the relationship itself will dictate the obligation. The fiduciary relationship itself, therefore, ought to 
furnish insight into the obligations that may arise.24 Since it is recognised that most fiduciary 
relationships arise in a private law context, then the nature of those obligations reflect principles in 
private law. Similarly, the notion of a public law fiduciary relationship ought to reflect the principles 
of the ius publicum. This removes the need to artificially impose private law concepts onto public law. 
III POLITICAL THEORY: THE NATURE OF A PUBLIC LAW 
RELATIONSHIP 
Much ink has been spilt discussing whether the relationship between a government and its 
population can be defined in fiduciary terms. The discussion arose out of the medieval concept of 
fiducia, and subsequent humanist debates about sovereign power.25 Political theorists would later, and 
  
18  At 480. 
19  Robert Megarry and PV Baker Snell's Principles of Equity (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973) at 548–549; 
and Ethan Leib, David Ponet and Michael Serota "Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law" (2013) 
126 Harv L Rev 91 at 93. 
20  Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773 at [10]. 
21  Virgo, above n 14, at 483; and Lanning, above n 3, at 447. 
22  Virgo, above n 14, at 479. 
23  Deborah DeMott "Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation" (1988) 37 Duke LJ 879 at 879. 
24  Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL) at 127; and J Derek Davies "Equitable Compensation: 'Causation, 
Foreseeability and Remoteness'" in Donovan WM Waters (ed) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, 
Scarborough, 1993) 297 at 310. 
25  Maloy, above n 2, at 492 and 497. 
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continue to, analyse this relationship through the construct of a "social contract".26 It is a hypothetical 
contract between the state and all its citizens about the exercise and limitations of sovereign power.27 
This topic is usually addressed in comparison to the "state of nature".28 Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan 
(1651) paints a graphic image of the condition of humanity in nature, which suggests the human life 
would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" without the formation of an ordered state.29 The 
Hobbesian approach indicates that political leadership provides the security necessary to avoid such 
a life.30 He observes that:31 
A Commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, 
with every one … From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him, 
or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled. 
Hobbes does not associate a fiduciary character with this relationship.32 Nonetheless, the social 
contract gradually came to be seen as a foundation for political trust and the idea that legitimate 
political rule stems from the consent of the governed.33  
Early political theorists defined sovereign power as either monarchic, or unelected authority, or 
republics as comprised of elected officials.34 Both forms of government invoke the social contract 
notion that is enforceable through the exercise of political power.35 It represents the tacit trust that 
  
26  John Rawls A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999) at 10–11. 
27  John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 2005) at 258. 
28  Frederick Pollock Locke's Theory of the State (Oxford University Press, London, 1937) at 5. 
29  Thomas Hobbes Leviathan JCA Gaskin (ed) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) at 84. 
30  At 85. See Gregory Kavka "Hobbes War of All against All" in Christopher Morris (ed) Critical Essays on 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau: The Social Contract Theorists (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 
(Maryland), 1999) 1 at 6; and Pollock, above n 28, at 6. Hobbes likely reflected on St Thomas Aquinas' 
Summa Theologica part 1, question 96, art 4, and the 13th century discussion about how law binds 
communities for the common good. The multi-volume translation of Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 
(translated ed: Fathers of the English Dominican Province (translator), Burns Oates & Washbourne, London, 
1920) is an accessible edition of the treatise. 
31  Hobbes, above n 29, at 115. 
32  Maloy, above n 2, at 495. 
33  Kent Greenawalt Conflicts of Law and Democracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987) at 56 and 62; 
Maloy, above n 2, at 500; and Victor Gourevitch Rousseau: The Social Contract and other later political 
writings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) at xv. 
34  Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince (translated ed: Luigi Ricci (translator), Oxford University Press, London, 
1910) at ch 1; Plato The Laws (translated ed: Trevor Saunders (translator), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 
1970) at 143; and Hobbes, above n 29, at 123. 
35  Greenawalt, above n 33, at 63; and Charles J Reid Jr "The Three Antinomies of Modern Legal Positivism and 
their Resolution in Christian Legal Thought" (2005) 18 Regent University Law Review 53 at 55. 
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citizens have placed in their government to manage their rights as a person and communal property 
for their benefit.36 The compact places the individual in a vulnerable position. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
begins his treatise The Social Contract (1762) with the statement: "Man is born free; and everywhere 
he is in chains".37 The political philosopher states the social contract is the solution to both the 
preservation of liberty and the commonweal.38 He reduces it as follows:39   
… each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, 
and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.  
The essence of the relationship requires the people to give up their natural freedom for the rights and 
obligations of community and security.40 John Rawls postulated a modern view of the social contract 
that interprets it as an agreement made by rational persons between each other about common 
principles of justice.41 These principles ultimately determine the form of political authority they 
establish to govern over them.42 In New Zealand, we accept the form of political authority is 
democratic in nature (a republic). 
People living in a democracy expect certain "terms of contract" that characterise their government 
as foremost a "rule by the people".43 Democracies also foster an expectation of certain rights, 
opportunities, and obligations.44 Principles of liberty and equality (and fraternity) purport to guarantee 
the same fundamental rights political for everyone, including the right to participate in political 
decision-making.45 Elections are the most visible facet of a democratic arrangement because they 
  
36  John Locke Two Treatises of Government (A Millar, London, 1763) at 349. 
37  Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract (translated ed: Christopher Betts (translator), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994) at [1.1]. 
38  At [1.6]. 
39  At [1.6].  
40  Locke, above n 36, at 198–199. See also Joshua Cohen "Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy" 
in Christopher Morris (ed) Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau: The Social Contract Theorists 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham (Maryland), 1999) 191 at 192. 
41  John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 10. 
42  Rawls, above n 26. 
43  David Held Models of Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996) at 1. 
44  Rawls, above n 27, at xlvi. 
45  John Rawls The Law of Peoples: With the Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002) at 29; Samuel Freeman Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political 
Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 31; and George Fallis Multiversities, Ideas, and 
Democracies (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007) at 5. 
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allow citizens in their majority to choose who amongst them should govern.46 The election process 
gives the governed a degree of control over elected officials, which gives rise to the expectation that 
political leadership will be accessible to public demands.47 Leaders who receive sufficient mandate 
from the public acquire discretion to act on their behalf as representatives. The leadership undertakes 
to ensure the good of the state and its populace is maintained, even when it is against the interests of 
the majority.48 Elections also ensure that public consensus can remove political leaders if the populace 
becomes generally dissatisfied with their performance.49 This power of election makes democracy 
the most desirable and stable system of governance in post-enlightenment Western thought.50 
Electoral power casts the public as beneficiaries of an exercise of political power. In New Zealand, 
Members of Parliament must make an oath of allegiance before they are able to sit or vote in the 
House of Representatives,51 which ought to be made according to the prescribed form.52 Members 
who refuse to swear must vacate their seat.53 The oath requirement accepts democratic states are 
comprised of elected and unelected officials, and reconciles the expectation of both as offices 
"characterised by trust, honesty, integrity, and mutual respect" in their capacity to exercise political 
power.54  
The relationship between the governing political leaders and the governed populace attracts the 
attention of political theorists and jurists who seek to identify fiduciary elements as a feature of the 
  
46  Carole Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970) at 4. 
47  At 9 and 14. 
48  NML Nathan "Democracy" (1993) 93 Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 123 at 123. 
49  Charles Sampford "Trust, Governance, and the Good Life" in Ken Coghill, Charles Sampford and Tim Smith 
(eds) Fiduciary Duty and the Atmospheric Trust (Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 2012) 43 at 50. 
50  Held, above n 43, at 46; and Thomas Meyer The Theory of Social Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007) 
at 9. 
51  David McGee, Mary Harris and David Wilson (eds) Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (4th ed, Oratia 
Books, Auckland, 2017) at ch 3. 
52  Oath and Declarations Act 1957, s 17. See also Oaths Act 1910, s 3. The distinction between an oath and 
affirmation is spiritual. 
53  See Mark Hutton and others (eds) Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice (24th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
London, 2011). 
54  Frederique E Six and Leo WJC Huberts "Judging a public official's integrity" in Leo WJC Huberts, Jeroen 
Maesschalck and Carole L Jurkiewicz (eds) Ethics and Integrity of Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2008) 65 at 66. 
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democratic social contract.55 These elements appreciate that the role of the people is to limit political 
power and hold their leaders accountable for its exercise.56 John Locke explicitly states:57  
… the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a 
supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust 
reposed in them.  
The notion of trust makes political leaders accountable to the public as a whole and not just 
constituents or loyal voters.58 It imposes an expectation that political leaders possess a high degree of 
moral integrity, which means allegations of illegal practice or even acting immorally can end 
careers.59 Leaders are to set aside self-interest to serve the entire population rather than pursue 
personal or group interests.60 However, a legal view that political leaders act as trustees of power is 
fundamentally different from ideas that such an actor must be politically trustworthy.61 This view 
invokes fiduciary notions that the public ought, as the beneficiaries of political power, to be able to 
trust political actors.62 The fiduciary characteristics of the arrangement does not take into account 
public opinion about the popularity of a political actor at any given moment in their career.63  
The recognition of fiduciary relationships in public law ought not interpret the social contract 
beyond a useful philosophical tool to conceptualise political relationships.64 It is a useful starting 
point, however, to understand a view that defines political power as fiduciary in nature.65 Justice Paul 
Finn, a foremost commentator on fiduciary law, made the often cited observation that "[t]he most 
  
55  John McCamus "Promethius Unbound: Fiduciary Obligation in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1997) 28 
CBLJ 107 at 107; Leib, Ponet and Serota, above n 19, at 93; and Fox-Decent, above n 1, at 4.  
56  Fox-Decent, above n 1, at 91 and 170; Sampford, above n 49, at 50; and Maloy, above n 2, at  501. 
57  Locke, above n 36, at 328. 
58  Peter Koslowski "Public Interest and Self-Interest in the Market" in Bernard Hodgson (ed) The Invisible Hand 
and the Common Good (Springer, New York, 2004) 13 at 29; and Leib, Ponet and Serota, above n 19, at 95. 
59  Six and Huberts, above n 54, at 65. 
60  At 67. 
61  At 69–70. 
62  Locke, above n 42, at 335; and Fox-Decent, above n 2, at 170. 
63  Frankel, above n 11, at xiii. 
64  Rawls, above n 27, at 273; Leib, Ponet and Serota, above n 19, at 92; Ralf Dahrendorf "The Social Contract 
in Static and Dynamic Perspective" in Peter Koslowski (ed) Individual Liberty and Democratic Decision-
Making (JCB Mohr, Tubingen, 1987) 53 at 56; and Joseph Kary "Contract Law and the Social Contract: What 
Legal History can Teach us about the Political Theory of Hobbes and Locke" (2000) 31 Ottawa L Rev 73 at 
75. 
65  Fox-Decent, above n 1, at 22. 
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fundamental fiduciary relationship in our society is manifestly that which exists between the 
community (the people) and the state, its agencies and officials".66 His words echo those of Jeremy 
Bentham, who stated:67  
Fiduciary Rights [are] those which are possessed to be exercised for the advantage of another only, such 
as those of factor, attorney, guardian, father, or husband in quality of guardian. All political power is 
fiduciary …   
Bentham earlier noted:68 
A fiduciary charge takes place between two or more interested parties, when, one of the parties being 
invested with a power or a right, is bound, in the exercise of this power and this right, by certain rules, for 
the advantage of the other party. This relation constitutes two conditions—the trustee, and the trustor … 
Bentham understood fiduciary duties in the modern sense and did not make an idle statement or 
refer to a theoretical philosophical compact. His inclusion of political power intimates a belief it ought 
to be included alongside other traditional fiduciary relationships. It imports the need to restrain that 
power through fiduciary obligations.69 Robert Flannigan, accepting that most fiduciary relationships 
form in a private law context, makes the bold assertion that "[f]iduciary obligations are imposed on 
political representatives, Crown agents and servants, and other actors exercising public functions in a 
variety of respects."70 At first glance, it is easy to dismiss the notion that the law regularly imposes 
fiduciary obligations on political actors as part of the social contract of a republic.  
The idea that the Crown and the public had a fiduciary relationship recognised by public law in 
the late 19th century did not give rise to legally enforceable obligations.71 It remained, however, an 
attractive notion amongst popular thought. Frederic Maitland, who doubted the notion of political 
trusts, stated: "Open an English newspaper and you will be unlucky if you do not see the word 'trustee' 
applied to 'the Crown' or to some high and mighty body."72 The popular impressions of political 
philosophy could not be enforced. In Kinloch v Secretary of State for India in Council, their Lordships 
distinguished private trusts, or lower trusts, from public political trusts, which the Court identified as 
  
66  Paul Finn "A sovereign people, a public trust" in Paul Finn (ed) Essays on Law and Government: Principles 
and Values (The Law Book Co, Sydney, 1995) 1 at 14. See also Fox-Decent, above n 1, at 170. 
67  Jeremy Bentham "A General View of a Complete Code of Laws" in John Bowring (ed) The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham (William Tait, Edinburgh, 1843) vol 3, 154 at 182. 
68  At 166. 
69  RC Nolan "Controlling Fiduciary Power" (2009) 68 CLJ 293 at 293. 
70  Robert Flannigan "The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability" [2004] NZ L Rev 215 at 232. 
71  Kinloch v Secretary of State for India in Council (1882) 7 App Cas 619 (HL). 
72  Frederic Maitland "Trust and Corporation" in HAL Fisher (ed) The Collected Papers of Frederic Maitland 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911) 327 at 403. 
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"trusts in the higher sense".73 This interpretation, now called "political trust theory", persisted in 
common law thought as unenforceable obligations throughout the 20th century. In Tito v Waddell (No 
2), Megarry VC restated the words of Lord Selborne LC as follows:74 
I propose to use the word "trust" simpliciter (or for emphasis the phrase "true trust") to describe what in 
the conventional sense is a trust enforceable in the courts, and to use Lord Selborne's compound phrase 
"trust in the higher sense" to express the governmental obligation that he describes.  
The idea of a "trust in the higher sense" as fiduciary notions forming part of the ius publicum has, 
however, been demonstrably challenged by 20th century and modern judicial developments. The 
object of this article, to provide a starting point for further articulation of a workable fiduciary aspect 
to public law, can only be achieved through an examination of the precedent before it.75  
IV PUBLIC LAW FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 
There are two lines of authority that support an argument that fiduciary concepts do appear in 
public law. The first arises between the Crown's relationship to aboriginal peoples, and the second 
concerns local authorities and ratepayers. The growth of juridical recognition of a fiduciary element 
to public law appears as a response to social pressure for the judiciary to hold political actors to 
account.76 Very occasionally the common law courts have invoked Lockean notions that cast the 
public as the beneficiary of political power.77 In Hawrelak v The City of Edmonton, Dickson and de 
Grandpré JJ stated:78 
Confidence in our institutions is at a low ebb. This statement is not very original but unfortunately is 
unchallengeable. Many factors have brought about this crisis and unconscionable conduct by public 
officials is only part of the story. Still, if we are to regain some of the lost ground, we have to start 
somewhere. To reaffirm the requirements of highest public morality in elected officials is a major step in 
that direction. To speak of civil liberties is very hollow indeed if these liberties are not founded on the 
  
73  Kinloch, above n 71, at 625–626 per Lord Selborne. 
74  Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 at 216. 
75  The fiduciary concepts discussed in this article ought not to be conflated with fundamental law notions 
advanced in Lindsay Breach "The Utility of a Medieval Charter in New Zealand Litigation: The Case of the 
Magna Carta" in Stephen Winter and Chris Jones (ed) Magna Carta and New Zealand: History, Politics and 
Law in Aotearoa (Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017) 161.  
76  Leonard I Rotman "Crown-Native Relations as Fiduciary: Reflections Almost Twenty-Years after Guerin" 
(2003) 22 Windsor Yearbook Access to Justice 363 at 368; Edward J Waitzer and Douglas Sarro "The Public 
Fiduciary: Emerging Themes in Canadian Fiduciary Law for Pension Trustees" (2012) 91 Canadian Bar 
Review 163 at 172. 
77  Andy Spalding "Freedom from Corruption: The New Human Right?" (2013) 107 ASIL PROC 483 at 484; 
and Waitzer and Sarro, above n 76, at 164. 
78  Hawrelak v The City of Edmonton [1976] 1 SCR 387 at 416–417. 
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rock of absolutely unimpeachable conduct on the part of those who have been entrusted with the 
administration of the public domain. 
One response to waning public confidence appears to be the importation of fiduciary concepts to 
prevent the usurpation of public power.79 The majority of cases, however, demonstrate that political 
actors do not ordinarily attract fiduciary obligations in the exercise of their discretion.80 Academics 
have criticised circumstances where the judiciary has used the language of fiduciary obligations when 
discussing public law without identifying what those duties are and to whom they might be owed.81 
Therefore, an acceptance of fiduciary principles in public law must contend with the question of their 
definition and scope.  
The recognition of fiduciary obligations in public law jurisprudence ought to be framed according 
to basic principles already articulated in the ius privatum, and according to notions of equity.82 Gerald 
Lanning outlines the following fundamental elements of fiduciary power, which he identifies ought 
to be applicable within a public law context:83  
(i) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. 
(ii) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion to affect the beneficiary's legal or 
practical interests. 
(iii) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or 
power. 
These elements were present in the leading authority Keech v Sandford.84 The foremost feature 
of a fiduciary relationship, identified in this case, is that the stronger party owes a duty of loyalty to 
the vulnerable party who has entrusted them with power, which requires them to act for the benefit of 
the weaker party and not place themselves in a position where a conflict of interest may arise.85 There 
appears to be consensus that any recognition of a fiduciary relationship in a public law context must 
  
79  Robert Flannigan "Fiduciary Control of Political Corruption" (2002) 26 Advocates Quarterly 252 at 260; and 
Spalding, above n 77, at 484. 
80  Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 385. 
81  Leonard Rotman "Provincial Fiduciary Obligations to First Nations: The Nexus between Governmental 
Power and Responsibility" (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 736 at 737; and Rotman, above n 76, at 366–369. 
82  Lanning, above n 3, at 450; Flannigan, above n 70, at 268; Nolan, above n 69, at 294; and Rotman, above n 
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import the duty of loyalty as its foremost feature.86 This also agrees with the populist view that 
political actors owe a general duty of loyalty to the public and should not engage in self-interested 
behaviour.87 It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain from authorities that recognise fiduciary 
relationships in public law whether they invoke elements of the duty of loyalty.  
A The Crown and Indigenous Peoples 
The idea that the Crown owes fiduciary obligations to indigenous peoples has been articulated 
strongest by the Canadian judiciary.88 In the landmark decision of Guerin v The Queen,89 Wilson J 
indicated that while s 18 of the Indian Act 195290 did not mention fiduciary obligations owed by the 
Crown, the Act "recognizes the existence of such an obligation. The obligation has its roots in the 
aboriginal title of Canada's Indians".91 Her Honour distinguished the "higher political trust" 
authorities from an actual fiduciary relationship because the latter arose from a legal right independent 
of legislation.92 She held the Supreme Court could impose fiduciary obligations onto the Crown to 
protect indigenous peoples.93 However, Dickson CJ sought to make clear that while the Crown must 
discharge its fiduciary obligations, they were not the same obligations as those found in private law.94 
His Honour indicated duties were enforceable not as a trust but in a manner that is trust-like.95 He 
reasoned:96 
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The Crown's obligation to the Indians with respect to that interest is therefore not a public law duty. While 
it is not a private law duty in the strict sense either, it is nonetheless in the nature of a private law duty. 
Therefore, in this sui generis relationship, it is not improper to regard the Crown as a fiduciary. 
His reasoning attracted criticism for obfuscating the nature of the obligations owed to indigenous 
peoples despite the Supreme Court's acknowledgement the Crown could owe fiduciary duties in their 
truest sense.97 Canadian decisions after Guerin, nevertheless, trended towards the recognition that the 
Crown and indigenous peoples had a fiduciary relationship, although without comment on its 
obligations.98 
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v Sparrow provides insight into the implications of 
the recognition of such relationships. It held:99 
The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and responsibility assumed by the Crown 
constituted the source of such a fiduciary obligation. In our opinion,  Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor, 
ground a general guiding principle for s 35.(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a 
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and 
aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of 
aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship. 
Sparrow indicates that the effect of recognising a fiduciary relationship in a public law context 
imports a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.100 In this case, the Court interpreted the Act 
in a manner that considers the historical relationship, traditions and treaties with indigenous people.101 
Since Sparrow, it is clear that Canadian jurisprudence accepts that the Crown owes unique fiduciary 
obligations to indigenous people.102 In Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, the Supreme Court 
reasserted, under a head that described the Crown's fiduciary duties as sui generis, that Canadian law 
had distinguished "political trusts" from the fiduciary obligations of the Crown that arise "in the nature 
of a private law duty".103 It indicated the relationship bore the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship 
because indigenous peoples are vulnerable to the Crown's power to exercise its discretion in respect 
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to their interests.104 The existence of a fiduciary relationship, therefore, imposes an additional 
consideration on an exercise of political power.105  
The decision in Wewaykum sought to limit occasions when indigenous peoples could invoke the 
fiduciary concept to "specific Indian interests".106 It reinforced the principle that "not all obligations 
existing between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in nature, and that this 
principle applies to the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples".107 Furthermore, 
Binnie J emphasised:108 
When exercising ordinary government powers in matters involving disputes between Indians and non-
Indians, the Crown was (and is) obliged to have regard to the interest of all affected parties, not just the 
Indian interest. The Crown can be no ordinary fiduciary; it wears many hats and represents many interests, 
some of which cannot help but be conflicting. 
This statement indicates that the Crown, as a fiduciary, does not owe an absolute duty of loyalty 
to Canadian Indians. In fact, the case is silent on the nature and extent of this core fiduciary element. 
These lingering uncertainties are a cause for consternation.109 Leonard Rotman critically suggests that 
"fiduciary" has simply taken life as a "catch-phrase" to describe government and indigenous 
relations.110 Nonetheless, a parliamentary report titled The Crown's Fiduciary Relationship with 
Aboriginal Peoples concludes that the "Supreme Court of Canada decisions confirm that the fiduciary 
relationship does have legal and constitutional scope. The concept itself and obligations arising from 
it are still being developed".111 It is evident that uncertainty arises, in part, because the judiciary is 
yet to accept that fiduciary principles must form part of either the ius publicum or the ius privatum. 
The decision to leave the definition of the Crown's role as a fiduciary in a state of purgatory is an 
unacceptable position. 
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The historic conditions that define the relationship between the Crown and the indigenous people 
of Canada as fiduciary in nature may also be interpreted to exist in New Zealand.112 This has signalled 
a need for jurists to reassess the nature of the Crown's relationship to Māori and the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi.113 For the moment, New Zealand courts continue to follow English authority that 
suggests the Crown could only be understood as a fiduciary in the higher sense.114 The argument that 
a fiduciary relationship could exist between the Crown and Māori, however, arises because of the 
continued uncertainty that surrounds the principles of the Treaty, which are summarised as 
partnership, preservation and protection, reasonable cooperation, and the recognition of the Treaty as 
a living document.115 They attract academic criticism for their ambiguous nature and also accusations 
they are tools for judicial activism, which are observations applicable to the Canadian experience.116 
It is, therefore, somewhat paradoxical that the reason why New Zealand courts are reluctant to 
recognise a fiduciary aspect to the Crown-Māori relationship is to avoid uncertainty and prevent the 
widening of the scope of claims against the Crown.117 Discussion about whether the relationship is 
fiduciary in nature also contends with the subject of Treaty obligations being more political than 
legal.118 It remains arguable, nevertheless, that the similarities of the developments in Canada and 
New Zealand indicate that an underlying fiduciary relationship exists between the Crown and Māori. 
The debate about whether a fiduciary relationship exists between the Crown and Māori emerged 
when the judiciary first articulated the Treaty principles. In New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-
General,119 referred to later as the Lands Case and now the SOE Case,120 adopted a purposive 
approach to interpreting s 9 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, which states: "Nothing in this 
Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of 
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Waitangi".121 President Cooke of the Court of Appeal observed that the "principles require the Pakeha 
and Maori Treaty partners to act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good faith".122 
His Honour also suggested, "[t]he relationship between the Treaty partners creates responsibilities 
analogous to fiduciary duties."123 This observation set a trend of subsequent decisions that recognised 
the government owes a fiduciary-like duty in its dealings with Māori.124 Later he would couch the 
relationship between the Crown and Māori chieftainship in the cloak of fiduciary obligation.125 Alex 
Frame suggests that the recognition of a fiduciary relationship in New Zealand law would not stem 
from the Treaty instrument itself but from the wider relationship.126 In response to apparent judicial 
rejection of this idea, he asserted:127 
The fiduciary doctrine did not 'fail to take root in New Zealand public law', but rather has not yet been 
seriously pleaded before the New Zealand courts with general jurisdiction, as Justice Blanchard explicitly 
foreshadowed.  
It is an attractive argument because the current law suggests the undesirable position that the Crown 
is in a fiduciary relationship with the indigenous peoples of Canada but not with Māori. 
Paki v Attorney-General is the most recent case to discuss the nature of the Crown-indigenous 
relationship in New Zealand.128 The appellants invited the Supreme Court to consider whether the 
Crown would be in breach of its fiduciary duties as a "constructive trustee" if it sought to claim the 
Waikato River and associated taonga.129 Elias CJ thought the existence of independent legal rights, 
analogous to the Canadian experience, and the recognition of the Crown's sovereignty gave rise to 
duties of a fiduciary nature.130 Her Honour approved of Cooke P's statement in Te Runanga o 
Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General that "an enduring relationship of a fiduciary nature in 
which each party accepted a positive duty to act in good faith, fairly, reasonably and honourably 
towards the other".131 The statements made by the Chief Justice suggest that actual fiduciary duties 
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may have arisen from the Treaty as an inherent part of New Zealand's social contract as a republic. 
However, William Young J adopted a narrower approach and directly treated the applicability of 
Canadian authority.132 His Honour referred to Binnie J's conclusion in Wewaykum that suggested 
Canadian jurisprudence had over-extended the fiduciary concepts.133 Justice William Young stated 
that:134  
There are many New Zealand cases in which the view has been expressed that the relationship between 
the Crown and Māori is either analogous to a fiduciary relationship or actually is fiduciary in character. 
However, he rejected the notion that "the Crown has a fiduciary duty in a private law sense that 
is enforceable against the Crown in equity".135 The judgment in Paki suggests that, in the minds of 
the judiciary, the fiduciary doctrine has failed to take root in New Zealand public law. 
New Zealand authority suggests the debate about whether the relationship between the Crown and 
Māori is fiduciary in nature is not yet resolved. If it is suggested that it exists as a fiduciary 
relationship, then it must arise in a public law context.136 The constitutional status of both the Treaty 
of Waitangi137 and s 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada),138 which recognises and affirms 
the constitutional status of treaties and indigenous rights of indigenous peoples in Canada, suggests 
that if New Zealand recognises a fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Māori, it will form 
part of public law jurisprudence. Evan Fox-Decent makes clear that the constitutional status of the 
Canadian treaties indicates that the fiduciary relationship must be regarded as forming part of the 
public law.139 The author would later err when he observed:140 
… it appears that New Zealand judges now see the Treaty of Waitangi as a source of partnership and 
fiduciary obligation because they appreciate that Māori did not agree to surrender their sovereignty and, 
therefore, the legitimacy of Crown sovereignty depends on the Crown being held to a fiduciary standard.  
It is likely an error made upon reflection about the similarities between the two jurisdictions. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that future developments in New Zealand will agree with the 
approach currently taken in Canada because fiduciary elements are already present within the Crown-
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Māori relationship. Nonetheless, these elements must be viewed in light of other forms of fiduciary 
relationship recognised in public law jurisprudence.  
B Local Authorities and Ratepayers 
There is clear and long-established precedent that the common law acknowledges the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship between local authorities and ratepayers.141 In New Zealand, the powers 
and functions of local authorities, primarily concerning the provision and maintenance of local 
infrastructure, is statutory in nature. In Paki, William Young J appears to have tied together the public 
law relationships between the Crown and local authorities with their respective beneficiaries, when 
he observed:142 
There are also cases in which the position of a local authority vis-à-vis its ratepayers has been characterised 
as fiduciary in nature. Most commonly, the courts have done this when limiting the ability of local 
authorities to use ratepayer funds to subsidise services or pay wages in excess of market rates. The 
underlying idea is that local authorities in relation to their ratepayers "[stand] somewhat in the position of 
trustees or managers of the property of others".143 In one New Zealand case, this principle was extended 
to require local authorities to "seek to balance fairly the respective interests of the different categories of 
ratepayers".144 
His Honour cast doubt on the fiduciary nature of this relationship when also dismissing the notion the 
Crown owed fiduciary obligations to Māori.145 The weight of authority, however, demonstrates with 
greater certainty that public law does entertain a fiduciary relationship between local authorities and 
ratepayers.  
The notion that political power is fiduciary in nature appears to have influenced the English 
judiciary with regard to the delegated sovereignty enjoyed by local authorities throughout the 20th 
century. Roberts v Hopwood concerned the Poplar Council's exercise of discretion to set a high 
minimum wage of £4 per week on "socialist" or "moral grounds" (irrelevant considerations) without 
due consideration of prevailing economic factors.146 The House of Lords held the local authority 
owed a fiduciary duty to consider the relevant interests of ratepayers, notwithstanding their electoral 
mandate, which the Council breached in an unreasonable exercise of its power.147 Subsequent English 
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decisions have reaffirmed the existence of this relationship. In Bromley London Borough Council v 
Greater London Council, it was observed:148   
A local authority owes a fiduciary duty to the ratepayers from whom it obtains moneys needed to carry 
out its statutory functions and this includes a duty not to expend those moneys thriftlessly but to deploy 
the full financial resources available to it to the best advantage.  
English authority demonstrates a greater judicial willingness to respond to public expectations by 
imposing fiduciary obligations on local authorities because they exercise delegated sovereign 
authority.149 This observation is applicable to the New Zealand experience. 
New Zealand followed English precedent to recognise that local authorities owe fiduciary duties 
to ratepayers. In Barton v Masterton District Council, the High Court held these duties are owed when 
a local authority spends and levies funds from ratepayers.150 Gallen J followed their Lordships' 
reasoning in Roberts to intimate that local authorities owe both moral and legal duties to ratepayers.151 
His Honour noted:152 
Fiduciary duties involve acting in accord with the dictates of conscience and the dictates of conscience 
require the observance of obligations where looked at fairly an informed and reasonable member of the 
community would believe such obligations to exist. In this context I am prepared to accept a principle of 
legitimate expectation … 
Shortly afterwards, the Court of Appeal in Mackenzie District Council v Electricity Corporation 
of New Zealand followed Barton to recognise the existence of such a fiduciary relationship.153 The 
judgment delivered by Richardson J recognised that the political power wielded by a local authority 
occupies a subordinate position to central government.154 The Court of Appeal noted that a local 
authority carries out its public function to perform undertakings, services and activities for the benefit 
of the community.155 It reasoned this imposed a general fiduciary duty to have regard for the interests 
of ratepayers when weighing up the exercise of this function.156 The Court held the local authority 
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had failed in this duty.157 These authorities provide little reason to doubt the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship in a public law context. 
There is academic criticism that these notions over-extend the fiduciary concept.158 In particular, 
an imposition of a fiduciary duty on local authorities may create a burden impossible to discharge 
because a council must contend with conflicting interests from various groups.159 In response to this 
issue, Fox-Decent suggests the recognition of a fiduciary duty reflects the need for transparent 
decision-making rather than the fact decisions may favour some groups over others.160 The 
observation made by Panckhurst J in Willowford Family Trust v Christchurch City Council appears 
agreeable to Fox-Decent's conclusion when he notes, citing Bromley, that "[e]lected representatives, 
although entitled to give weight to the views of, or mandate from, constituents, may not regard 
themselves as bound to that viewpoint."161 The case law seems to focus fiduciary obligations on 
transparency and reasonableness of decision-making. There appears, however, to be limits. In 
Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2), the Court of Appeal held:162 
The judgment in Mackenzie went on to observe that a local authority has a fiduciary duty to the ratepayers 
to have regard to their interests. That is a consideration which is perhaps more readily applicable to 
spending than to funding decisions … the fiduciary duty concept does not open up a route by which the 
Court can investigate and if thought appropriate interfere with every exercise by local authorities of their 
discretionary powers. That would completely undermine Wednesbury principles. 
This decision attempts to establish a boundary between principles of judicial review and fiduciary 
obligations, which requires further comment because of the infancy of the present subject. Reference 
to judicial review, however, demonstrates that the Court envisaged this fiduciary relationship as a 
public law concept and did not attempt to define it as a sui generis relationship of the kind clumsily 
imposed on Crown-indigenous relations. 
Canadian authority is clearer on the public law nature of the fiduciary relationship between local 
authorities and ratepayers. In Bowes v City of Toronto, the Privy Council held:163 
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We are of opinion, however, that neither the governing character nor the deliberative character of the 
Corporation Council makes any difference, and that the Council was in effect and substance a body of 
trustees for the inhabitants of Toronto; trustees having a considerable extent of discretion and power, but 
having also duties to perform, and forbidden to act corruptly. 
However, their Lordships noted the difficulty of extending the principles to elected government 
officials. They observed:164 
With regard to members of a Legislature, properly so called, who vote in support of their private interests; 
if that ever happens, there may possibly be insurmountable difficulties in the way of the practical 
application of some acknowledged principles by Courts of civil justice, which Courts, however, are 
nevertheless bound to apply those principles where they can be applied. 
The Privy Council appears to have raised the same public policy concerns that the Court of Appeal 
in Wellington City Council identified as democratic and constitutional constraints to judicial 
interference with the ordinary affairs of the Council.165 It identified misconstrued statutory power and 
failure to follow statutory process as examples of when the judiciary may intervene.166 This 
observation appears applicable to the further development of the fiduciary obligations owed by the 
Crown, in particular with regard to indigenous peoples.  
Canadian authorities indicate ratepayers are able to bring actions to restrain individual councillors 
in some circumstances.167 The elected representative that has commercial dealings with the 
municipality while in office is a common theme.168 Hawrelak v The City of Edmonton concerned a 
mayor who held 50 per cent of the shareholding of a company that had entered into negotiations with 
the local authority for rezoning of land it owned and its subsequent sale to the Council.169 The Mayor 
signed the transaction on behalf of the company, in his capacity as an officer, which was sent to the 
local authority that executed the agreement. He also presided over the rezoning scheme and then sold 
his shares for a substantial profit.170 Justice Spence recognised the mayor held a position analogous 
to a trustee who owes duties and is accountable to the municipality.171 Prior to the decision, there had 
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been considerable support for strengthening the fiduciary duties of elected representatives because of 
their position of trust.172 However, the majority determined on the facts of the case that no fiduciary 
duties had been breached.173 If the Court had found the Mayor to have breached his fiduciary 
obligations, the expected result would be an account of profits and potential disqualification from 
office.174 One commentator observed that the Supreme Court had no conceptual difficulty recognising 
the Mayor was in a fiduciary relationship with both the Council and ratepayers.175 Jacobs lamented, 
however, that the Supreme Court failed to define the fiduciary duties it identified to reflect the power 
and responsibility of public officials.176 
The judicial recognition of public law fiduciary duties owed by public officials may provide 
greater certainty to cases previously identified as falling under the tort of misfeasance in public office, 
which is the sole tortious action against political actors exceeding or abusing their office.177 Juristic 
commentary since Anns v Merton London Borough Council178 reveals unease at a tort attempting to 
define the relationship between public authority and individuals.179 Furthermore, judicial treatment 
of the tort also underwent significant shifts in approach that mirrored changes in dominant political 
ideologies.180 It is unsurprising the tort is often labelled unprincipled and incoherent.181 There is also 
ample reason to doubt whether it is a tort at all.182 Dan Priel observes:183 
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On the more traditional understanding of tort law, it belongs firmly within 'private law'; as such it is only 
concerned with redressing private wrongs and any suggestion that it should be affected by the changing 
relationship between individual and the state would be misplaced. 
There is a clear need to reassess whether a tort of misfeasance in public office exists. Stephen 
Bailey observed:184 
The story thus far does not show the common-law method of developing the law in a flattering light. 
Recurrent features of the case-law include what (at least with hindsight) can be seen as fundamental errors 
of analysis, the introduction of complex and ultimately unworkable sub-principles into the picture and a 
persistent confusion between public and private law principles. 
The jurisprudential difficulties identified by Bailey and others would be avoided by a re-
examination of these cases in light of fiduciary principles, which do not encroach on the clear 
boundary between private and public law.185 
The overarching rationale behind the tort of misfeasance in public office is to protect citizens 
against the wrongdoing from a misuse of public power.186 This overall purpose underpins judicial 
recognition of public law fiduciary obligations. Stephen Bailey identifies a number of principles that 
could shape future expansion of fiduciary concepts in place of this tort. Like in the fiduciary 
relationship between the Crown and indigenous peoples, there is a duty to act in good faith.187 Bailey 
indicates the invocation of the tort, therefore, requires either:188 
… (a) 'targeted malice', ie conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons; or (b) 'untargeted 
malice', ie conduct whereby a public officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained 
of and that the act will probably injure the claimant, it being sufficient here that an act is performed with 
(subjective or advertent) reckless indifference as to the outcome. 
Bailey further observes that liability arises when either there is an irrational failure to exercise a 
power or the harm is inflicted through an unlawful or careless action, or maladministration.189 His 
observation that liability will not arise if an act falls within the ambit of statutory discretion agrees 
with the limitation on judicial interference outlined in Wellington City Council applicable to a public 
law fiduciary relationship.190 The reclassification of these principles offers greater clarity to fiduciary 
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concepts applicable to individuals in public law and preserves the integrity of tortious acts as private 
wrongs. 
V LOYALTY IN A PUBLIC LAW CONTEXT 
The meaning of a duty of loyalty as part of a fiduciary relationship is yet to be clearly articulated 
in a public law context. In Paki, William Young J accepted the observation made by Binnie J that the 
Crown cannot be described as an ordinary fiduciary and, therefore, did not owe an absolute duty of 
loyalty to Māori.191 Elias CJ observed:192 
The language of "fiduciary" obligations is now familiar in connection with the dealings between the 
sovereign and indigenous peoples, including in decisions of the courts in New Zealand. Although a usual 
characteristic of a fiduciary is loyalty, a fiduciary duty in the sense in which it has been recognised in 
respect of indigenous people in New Zealand and in Canada does not seem to depend on a relationship 
characterised by loyalty. It follows that, without further development in a case in which the point arises, 
it remains an open question …  
Future cases may provide further clarity to the duty of loyalty in a public law context, although 
earlier authorities and juristic commentary provide some guidance. It is likely the judiciary will 
continue to define some fiduciary obligations as unenforceable if they fall within the higher trust 
concept. Nevertheless, the decision in Guerin suggests that the duty of loyalty is an aspect of a public 
law fiduciary relationship.193 In this context, the duty arose immediately at the time when the Crown 
first established jurisdiction over the indigenous people of Canada.194 Loyalty in this context includes 
elements of good faith that also form part of the Treaty principles in New Zealand.195 Furthermore, 
the idea invokes notions of social contract theory that the Crown immediately undertook fiduciary 
obligations in exchange for a recognition of legitimacy to assert sovereign power.196 
The observation made in Wewaykum would appear to accept a conclusion that the Crown cannot 
owe an absolute duty of loyalty to a single party at the expense of other interests. Flannigan suggests 
Canadian authority has confused the subject by giving the fiduciary label to all aspects of the 
relationship.197  
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Nonetheless, a duty of loyalty in public law appears discernible when a specific relationship arises 
out of a particular arrangement or interaction.198 An identifiable class of claimants appears to limit 
the scope of the fiduciary doctrine in public law.199 In Guerin, the criteria for an obligation of loyalty 
in a public law context appear to have been satisfied because of a particular dealing with land.200 The 
fiduciary label also appears to characterise the relationship between the Crown and Māori as a trust 
relationship. It is explicitly indicated in s 98(5) of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 
2011, which permits the High Court to determine an indigenous rights claim that "is based on, or relies 
on … the fiduciary duty of the Crown". The Crown's jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of 
customary exceptions to the general law falls within the ambit of the ius publicum.201 This could 
impose a future obligation on the Crown to take positive actions to protect the customary marine and 
coastal areas against rising sea levels.202 Nevertheless, the express acknowledgement of a fiduciary 
duty in legislation is the clearest indicator of their existence.203 
The discussion about the duty of loyalty in the Crown-indigenous context appears to apply to 
other Crown relationships. In Harris v Canada (TD), the aggrieved taxpayer argued the Minister of 
National Revenue had a fiduciary relationship with taxpayers.204 This case unfortunately included 
unsubstantiated allegations of favouritism, ulterior motivations and illegal conduct.205 The Federal 
Court did not find a fiduciary relationship in this case. However, Dawson J outlined the following 
considerations:206 
(1) The Crown may in some circumstances owe a fiduciary duty, or a duty akin to a fiduciary duty. 
…  
(3) Where the Crown owes duties to a number of interests it is more likely that the Crown is not in a 
fiduciary relationship, but rather is exercising a public authority governed by the proper construction of 
the relevant statute. 
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(4) A fiduciary relationship is unlikely to exist where that would place the Crown in a conflict between its 
responsibility to act in the public interest and the fiduciary's duty of loyalty to its beneficiary. 
This analysis, applicable to a Minister of the Crown, appears to accept that a duty of loyalty may 
arise if a specific relationship exists. Furthermore, the court will adopt a narrow interpretation in 
finding the existence of a fiduciary relationship. The duty of loyalty appears to attach itself to the 
discretionary power of administration that the fiduciary has assumed over the beneficiary.207 
The question about whether a legal relationship is fiduciary in nature is not a closed subject.208 A 
number of commentators have raised the possibility that elected politicians owe fiduciary duties to 
the wider populace. Flannigan suggests:209 
Political office is an exemplar or archetype of the kind of arrangement that generally attracts fiduciary 
accountability. Politicians are granted access to public powers and property for the limited purpose of 
furthering the public good. That limited purpose may be pursued by all acceptable political means.  
His opinion resonates with the popular view that the relationship between elected officials and the 
public requires both loyalty and integrity.210 The duty of loyalty imposes on the fiduciary a 
requirement that they must avoid conduct in mala fides.211 Guerin indicated, in a public law context, 
this would not allow a fiduciary to engage in unconscionable behaviour without making good "the 
losses suffered in consequence".212 Fox-Decent elaborated upon this position when he observed: "To 
meet its justificatory burden, the Crown must show that it has acted in accordance with 'a high standard 
of honourable dealing'".213 Harris indicated there is no conceptual difficulty about the recognition of 
fiduciary obligations between officers of the Crown, Members of Parliament, or other public law 
offices, and the public in the same manner as the Crown owes fiduciary obligations to indigenous 
people or local authorities owe to ratepayers.214 
The public duty argument suggests the duty of loyalty in public law must be a soft duty, which 
becomes enforceable only when a specific relationship exists between the parties. Flannigan indicates 
that "[t]he 'public duty' argument" accepts that "individual citizens cannot enforce public duties unless 
  
207  Fox-Decent, above n 102, at 110. 
208  Paki, above n 112, at [152]. 
209  Flannigan, above n 79, at 260. 
210  Lindsay Aargaard "Fiduciary Duty and Members of Parliament" (2008) Canadian Parliamentary Review 31 
at 35. 
211  Nolan, above n 69, at 296. 
212  Guerin, above n 80, at 337. 
213  Fox-Decent, above n 102, at 97 (citations omitted). 
214  At 101. 
 FIDUCIA IN PUBLIC LAW 439 
 
 
they have a special interest or peculiar loss not shared with the general public".215 The tort of 
misfeasance suggests aspects of targeted or untargeted malice would breach fiduciary obligations 
because such conduct would not ordinarily be in the public interest. However, Flannigan goes further 
than requiring a specific relationship to inform the duty of loyalty in a public law context. He 
provides:216  
Where public duties are discounted or subverted by the exploitation of power or office for private benefit, 
there is no 'public' foundation for immunity from civil actions instituted by the acknowledged beneficiaries 
of those duties.  
The decision in Hawrelak, concerning accusations that a mayor exploited his public office for 
private benefit, suggests that any member of the public could bring an action for breach of a fiduciary 
duty against a political actor that abuses their office to make a secret profit without suffering a special 
interest or loss. This is a controversial suggestion and courts will likely require more than 
discretionary power or vulnerability in political decision-making before making a finding that 
politicians have breached a broad duty of loyalty. In the meantime, a narrower interpretation that 
limits the concept to a specific relationship accepts that the nature of the public law fiduciary 
relationships remains in its infancy despite a lengthy pedigree in political theory.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The idea that the relationship between political power and the population is fiduciary in nature is 
traceable to enlightenment philosophes and the first iterations of the social contract. There is nothing 
revolutionary, therefore, about a modern suggestion of the same. Many arguments in favour of the 
notion indicate that the recognition of fiduciary obligations may impose a higher standard of 
accountability and encourage political actors to have a higher regard for the interests of those affected 
by political decisions.217 These arguments appeal to the legitimate expectations of those who live in 
a democracy. However, it is difficult to create workable principles to furnish legal definition to a 
public law fiduciary relationship when numerous scenarios have attracted the "fiduciary" label. 
Nonetheless, the decisions related to Crown-indigenous and local authority-ratepayer relationships 
demonstrate that fiducia can cut across the jurisprudential divide between private law and public law. 
This is a conceptually sound position and necessary to avoid the confusion that has resulted from their 
classification as sui generis. Nonetheless, a public law interpretation of fiducia will import qualities 
that distinguish it from its private law application. The clearest difference is that a private law 
fiduciary who owes an absolute duty of loyalty to a beneficiary cannot be transposed onto a public 
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law fiduciary who has multiple interests to consider. Existing authority suggests the judiciary requires 
the existence of a specific relationship between a public body and a limited class of beneficiaries 
before it will distinguish enforceable fiduciary obligations from "higher trust" concepts. Therefore, it 
is likely that future articulation will draw upon the principles related to public authority liability found 
in the law of tort. There remains, however, many outstanding questions about the nature and scope of 
fiduciary concepts in public law.  
